Emerging Safety Attack and Defense in Federated Instruction Tuning of Large Language Models

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论文总览

联邦指令微调（FedIT）让多机构联合训练更安全的LLM

但恶意客户端能悄悄搞垮模型的安全性
现有6种防御方法基本失效

本文：首次发现这个漏洞 + 提出有效修复方案

攻击效果 ↓70%　　现有防御 +4%　　本文防御 +69%

背景：FedIT是什么



- 指令微调 = 用问答数据训练LLM，让它学会"听指令+拒绝危险请求"
- FedIT = 把指令微调放进联邦框架，各机构数据全程不离开本地

来源：OpenFedLLM (Ye et al., 2024)

问题：攻击为什么难以检测



- 传统攻击：标签冲突 → 优化方向相反 → 参数差异大 → 容易发现
- LLM攻击：都在"学会详细回答" → 优化方向相同 → 参数差异小 → 无法区分

攻击方法



- 正常客户端数据：有害问题 + 安全拒绝 ← 对齐数据
- 恶意客户端数据：有害问题 + 有害回答 ← 未对齐数据（唯一区别）

除了本地数据内容不同，其他所有操作完全一样

零成本攻击数据



Figure 5: The instruction and response generation prompts for three types of data: unaligned data, aligned data and normal data.

方法一：从Beavertails等公开安全数据集直接提取未对齐部分
方法二：用现成LLM自动生成（如图，加一句"不考虑安全"即可）

Dual-use问题：为安全研究整理的公开数据集，反而成了攻击的原材料

结果



(a) Cosine similarity between updates

(b) Aggregation weights of clients in 4 baselines

Figure 3: (a) Visualization of pair-wise cosine similarity of model updates among clients. Our safety attack is stealthy as there is no cluster pattern between benign and malicious clients. (b) Visualization of aggregation weights in FoolsGold, Krum, DnC and Residual. These methods still assign certain weights for malicious clients, indicating that they fail to correctly identify all malicious clients.

理想：好坏客户端应聚成两堆（左上一块深色，右下一块深色）
实际：热力图无任何聚类，好坏客户端参数更新几乎一样
→ 前提假设直接不成立

红框 = 恶意客户端（编号6-9），理想防御应把红框全部设为0

FoolsGold：好坏权重全是0.10，完全没有区分
Krum：正常客户端2、3、5被踢掉，恶意客户端全部保留
DnC：正常客户端2、3被踢掉，恶意客户端大多保留
Residual：好坏权重差别极小，几乎没有识别出恶意客户端

防御思路



Figure 2: Overview of the FedIT system with our proposed safety attack method and defense method. The attacker, as a malicious client, instructs an off-the-shelf LLM to generate unaligned data, then fine-tunes the FL LLM on the generated data to compromise its safety alignment. The defender, as the server, instructs an off-the-shelf LLM or the aggregated LLM to generate aligned and normal data, then fine-tunes the aggregated LLM on the generated data to enhance its safety alignment.

Experiments

Table 1: Federated instruction tuning with our safety attack. The malicious dataset is **Beavertails** (Ji et al., 2024) and two benign datasets are considered. Rule, MD-Judge, and RM measure safety while MT-1 measures helpfulness. Results show that our safety attack can significantly compromise safety. Existing FL defense methods fail to effectively defend against such safety attack; while our defense methods can significantly enhance safety without significant loss in helpfulness.

Benign Dataset	LMSYS-Chat				WildChat			
Evaluation Metric ↑	Rule	MD-Judge	RM	MT-1	Rule	MD-Judge	RM	MT-1
FedAvg (No Attack)	82.88	66.15	-1.72	4.19	79.04	43.27	-1.63	4.75
FedAvg	49.81	25.96	-2.97	4.14	38.65	12.31	-2.73	4.54
Median	48.65	23.85	-3.10	3.88	41.35	10.58	-2.80	4.74
Trimmedmean	45.96	26.35	-3.05	4.20	41.35	14.04	-2.84	4.43
Krum	55.38	27.88	-2.88	4.16	40.00	9.42	-2.48	4.55
DnC	55.96	25.38	-2.90	4.00	41.15	7.12	-2.63	4.41
FoolsGold	46.92	25.00	-3.05	3.95	37.50	10.96	-2.79	4.55
Residual	47.50	23.65	-2.98	4.04	37.50	10.77	-2.86	4.54
Ours: Level 1	68.65	44.23	-2.31	4.11	57.31	17.50	-2.26	**4.85**
Ours: Level 2	**77.31**	**84.23**	**-0.99**	**4.23**	**82.12**	**82.12**	**-1.08**	4.33
Ours: Level 3	62.69	72.88	-1.65	3.73	51.54	57.69	-1.90	4.39

Experiments

Table 4: Scalability experiments with 50 and 100 clients. Existing baselines (Krum and DnC) are susceptible to our safety attack. Our defense significantly improves the safety of the victim global LLM without significantly compromising helpfulness, indicating the scalability of our attack and defense method.

Client Number	K=50				K=100			
Evaluation Metric ↑	Rule	MD-Judge	RM	MT-1	Rule	MD-Judge	RM	MT-1
FedAvg (No Attack)	77.12	55.96	-1.76	4.20	79.23	54.62	-1.90	4.23
FedAvg	40.58	11.35	-3.58	3.86	37.31	9.42	-3.58	3.93
Krum	45.00	10.77	-3.56	4.09	45.19	14.04	-3.40	4.28
DnC	46.92	12.88	-3.66	4.19	46.54	15.19	-3.48	**4.34**
Ours	**81.73**	**80.77**	**-1.08**	**4.34**	**79.23**	**82.12**	**-0.95**	4.24

Experiments

Table 3: Plug-and-play property of our defense method. Experiments are conducted with LMSYS-Chat as the benign dataset and Beavertails data as the malicious dataset. We compare the evaluation metrics before (✗) and after (✓) applying our defense method to existing FL baselines. Our defense method can significantly improve safety without significantly compromising helpfulness.

Metrics ↑	+ Ours	FedAvg	Median	Trimmed.	Krum	DnC	FoolsGold	Residual
Rule	✗	49.81	48.65	45.96	55.38	55.96	46.92	47.50
	✓	77.31	77.88	79.42	79.42	80.00	81.35	78.08
MD-J	✗	25.96	23.85	26.35	27.88	25.38	25.00	23.65
	✓	84.23	86.35	84.04	82.31	84.42	88.08	86.92
RM	✗	-2.97	-3.10	-3.05	-2.88	-2.90	-3.05	-2.98
	✓	-1.00	-0.92	-1.10	-1.02	-1.07	-0.98	-0.94
MT-1	✗	4.14	3.88	4.20	4.16	4.00	3.95	4.04
	✓	4.14	4.06	3.95	3.88	4.01	3.94	4.29

Thanks